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History

“Spitting Positively Forbidden”: The Anti-Spitting Campaigns, 1896-1910
Chairperson: Kyle G. Volk
Following the development of the germ theory of tuberculosis in the 1880s, American medical
reformers crafted a series of policies devoted to eradicating the “great white plague.” Among
these was the legal prohibition of spitting, a habit that had proliferated in step with Americans’
taste for chewing tobacco and had bedeviled social commentators for generations. Armed with
increasing professional stature, medial professionals encouraged hundreds of cities, as well as
several states, to ban spitting in places such as street cars, transit stations, sidewalks, and public
buildings. This effort revealed the extent of medical authority at the turn of the century and sheds
light on the ways advances in medicine encouraged Americans to reconsider popular notions of
“liberty.” Medical reformers argued that the right to bodily integrity and the well being of
communities superseded the right of any individual to indiscriminately spit, a position many
journalists, social activists, and educators supported. In the process, their efforts not only altered
municipal codes, but also sought to transform the meaning of individual liberty within the public
sphere.

2

Why should men expectorate broadcast over the
land, if in so doing they are often casting out the
germ that is to bring misery and want, maybe, to
many an industrious and worthy neighbor? This is
not extravagance: it is simply truth.
- Report of the Connecticut Commission for the
Investigation of Tuberculosis, 19081
In his 1920 history of the National Tuberculosis Association, S. Adolphus Knopf
remembered 1889 as a great turning point in the American war against consumption. It was in
that year, he recalled, that a group of prominent New York physicians presented the city’s health
department with a report calling attention to the communicability of tuberculosis and
recommended a series of measures to prevent the spread of the disease. In response to the report,
the department distributed a leaflet recommending health-conscious behaviors throughout the
tenement houses of the city and to every family where a death from consumption had occurred.
The leaflet implored readers to sleep separately from consumptives, to separate their clothing
from that of the infected, and to strip patients’ sleeping quarters of rugs, furnishings, and wall
hangings. The first and most significant rule, however, was to forbid “persons suspected to have
consumption to spit on the floor or on cloths unless the latter be immediately burned.”2
Knopf believed the 1889 leaflet was the first acknowledgement by a public health
department of the contagious nature of tuberculosis, as well as the first attempt to mitigate the
contagion through recommended behaviors. Whether or not this was the case, Knopf was right to
emphasize the leaflet’s significance, as it represented the first attempt by an American
government to explicitly connect spitting to the transmission of tuberculosis. The implications of
that connection cannot be understated: tuberculosis was the leading cause of mortality in the
1

Report of Special Commission Appointed to Investigate Tuberculosis (Hartford: State of
Connecticut, 1908), 16.
2
S. Adolphus Knopf, A History of the National Tuberculosis Association (Philadelphia: Wm.
Fell Co. Printers, 1922), 6.
3

turn-of-the-century United States. By 1900, approximately 150,000 Americans succumbed to
consumption each year, while over one million more were infected. Although the poor suffered
most acutely, tuberculosis struck families of all social and economic classes. From New England
to California, it cast a pall upon the neighborhoods, workplaces, schools and homes where it
appeared. Spitting, meanwhile, remained a ubiquitous habit that Americans had, depending on
their perspectives, either enjoyed or suffered for generations. By connecting spitting to
tuberculosis, the New York Department of Health began a decades-long process in which this
traditional habit of American men was transformed from an annoyance into a public health
threat.3
As the turn-of-the-century approached, health departments throughout the United States
increasingly followed New York’s lead and emphasized the connection between spitting and the
spread of disease. In so doing, they drew on a veritable toolbox of strategies to challenge the
practice in both public and private spaces. Their tactics included measures of public education,
such as New York’s leaflet; the use of newspapers to condemn incorrigible spitters; and
encouraging laypersons to spread the anti-spitting gospel within their communities. The most
prominent strategy of the period, however, was legislative prohibition. New York passed the
nation’s first spitting ban in 1896, and by 1910 nearly 150 American cities, countless smaller
towns, and thirteen states had outlawed spitting in some form.4 During those fourteen years, the
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Jeanne Abrams, “‘Spitting is Dangerous, Indecent, and Against the Law!’ Legislating Health
Behavior during the American Tuberculosis Crusade,” Journal of the History of Medicine, Jul.
2013, 417; Nancy Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American
Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 5.
4
Philip P. Jacobs, ed., A Tuberculosis Directory (New York: The National Association for the
Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis, 1911). States with spitting regulations included
California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. While many state laws mirrored local
4

aforementioned educational strategies proliferated as well as boards of health and supportive
voluntary associations sought to publicize and explain the bans. Indeed, so significant were
ordinances to the broader anti-spitting movement that many public health officials equated their
success – commonly calculated in terms of fines paid or spitters arrested – with the broader effort
to eliminate public spitting and the plague of tuberculosis.
Health boards rested their prohibitive authority upon two increasingly common
assumptions: first, in the age of bacteriology, the elite physicians supporting boards of health
claimed access to knowledge unavailable to most Americans. Since the formation of groups such
as the American Medical Association and the American Public Health Association earlier in the
nineteenth century, physicians with formal education and state-backed medical licenses had
worked to monopolize their field by excluding those with “irregular” or informal training.
Advances in bacteriology during the 1870s and 1880s only solidified formal physicians’ hold on
the profession and the majority of Americans’ trust in their methods. Of course many lay people
and scores of conservative and irregular medical practitioners rejected the science of
bacteriology, but by the turn-of-the-century municipal leaders were generally willing to accept
the bacteriologically inspired admonitions of boards of health. Indeed, despite the prevalence of
dissent, anti-spitting emerged during a period of cultural concession on behalf of lay people in
favor of physicians’ proscriptive advice for both public and personal health.5

legislation by simply banning all public spitting, some, such as in Tennessee and Texas, instead
controlled spitting by mandating that railways, businesses, and churches provide spittoons.
5
Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign
Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 10. Starr argues
that the period saw a “surrender of private judgment on behalf of law people in favor of
physicians’ professional advice.” Also see John Duffy, The Sanitarians: A History of American
Public Health (Urbana: 1990), 126 – 137 and 193 – 203. Duffy argues that the surrender of
private judgment was not necessarily the product of professional appeals, but rather in many
cases “the public was far quicker to accept the germ theory than physicians were.” Indeed,
5

The second basis for medical authority was an emerging sense that the nation’s problems
required a reconsideration of liberty. Spurning laissez-faire conceptions of self-sovereignty,
medical reformers drew on a long tradition of municipal regulation to expand state powers and
ensure citizens’ freedom from injury or disease.6 In a number of notable cases, these reforms
addressed modern risks as brought on by institutions: ineffective or unresponsive municipal
governments that failed to treat drinking water, for example, or railroad corporations that
prioritized speed over safety.7 The anti-spitting impulse was similar, in that it prioritized the right
of Americans to control the risks of simply existing in a modern society. Further, like reforms in
rail transit and labor, anti-spitting relied on the assumption that reform was necessary to protect
women. Because they were not viewed as likely spitters, and because long dresses were prone to
gather spit from floors, stairs, or sidewalks, women represented the most obvious victims of
indiscriminate spitting. The anti-spitting impulse differed from other reforms, however, in that it
sought to minimize risk not by targeting institutions but specific individuals. From the reformers’
perspective, the right to bodily integrity and the wellbeing of society superseded the right of any
individual to indiscriminately spit, thus legitimizing the state’s exercise of force in punishing
spitters. Supporting this argument were hundreds of private civic associations dedicated to the
eradication of tuberculosis, the beautification of cities, and developing greater public influence
for women. These organizations operated through a broad, multifaceted approach in which

conservative physicians resisted bacteriology for a number of years after public health agencies,
and the public more generally, began accepting it.
6
William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
7
See Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad
Revolution, 1865 – 1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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disparate interests coalesced around the goal of cleaner, healthier cities.8 For example, the
National Tuberculosis Association and its myriad local chapters, along with chapters of the
Women’s Health Protective Association and Federation of Women’s Clubs, aggressively lobbied
municipal governments to implement anti-spitting ordinances. To leverage their positions, they
turned to newspapers, public speeches, and the influence of vast reform society networks. In the
process, they not only altered municipal codes, but also sought to transform the meaning of
individual liberty within the public sphere.9
As it turned out, those who most frequently enjoyed the liberty and suffered the
punishment of public spitting were men. There is little evidence that men of particular social
classes, ethnic backgrounds, or professions spit more often than others; rather, as cities enforced
ordinances, they fined and arrested wage laborers, professors, attorneys, and even mayors.10

8

Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order: 1877 – 1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 166.
Wiebe argued that voluntary organizations during the Progressive era employed “an unusually
open, expansive scheme of reform.”
9
See Sarah Deutsch, Women and the City: Gender, Space, and Power in Boston, 1870 – 1940
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); John Duffy, The Sanitarians; Barbara Young
Welke, Recasting American Liberty.
10
“Professor Caught in Spitting Raid,” New York Evening Telegram, Nov. 20, 1903; “City
Attorney Fined,” The New York Times, Jan. 19, 1908; “Mayor Fined Under His Anti-Spitting
Rule,” San Francisco Call, May 6, 1910. See Georgina Feldberg, Disease and Class:
Tuberculosis and the Shaping of Modern North American Society (New Brunswick, 1995),
especially 87. Feldberg argues that spitting was “a behavior born of ignorance, lack of
opportunity, or lack of control.” While I support her broader argument that anti-spitting
represented an attempt by middle-class reformers to impose their sense of propriety upon other
classes, her classification of spitting as a product of ignorance and lack of opportunity neglects
both the ubiquity of the habit and the diverse backgrounds of accused spitters. Further, her
conflation of middle-class reformers with the middle-class as a whole is too general: indeed,
there are several examples of women campaigning for anti-spitting ordinances only to later see
their husbands or brothers arrested under the law. For example, Seth Jones of Elkhart, Indiana
became that city’s first arrest after his wife vigorously campaigned for an anti-spitting law.
“Wife’s Law Hits Husband,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 17, 1904. Following his arrest for
spitting in New York, Leo Kahn “not only had a fine but got a severe scolding from his sister as
well.” She was a member of the city’s anti-tuberculosis society and was active in the prevention
of spitting. “Raid on Spitters Catches Hundreds,” New York Times, Feb. 10, 1909.
7

Following a Pittsburg dragnet in 1907, for example, reporters noted that the only distinguishing
feature of the 100 arrested spitters was their diversity: “[t]here was no discrimination as to race,
color, creed, or station in life…the laborer rubbed elbows with the business man, and the
merchant was followed by an alien or a negro.”11 Of course there are reasons to doubt claims of
objectivity, not the least of which was health departments’ interest in portraying their laws as
universally applicable. Nonetheless, evidence consistently reveals that anti-spitting ordinances
affected men of all walks of life. In doing so, they transformed the very definition of male
citizenship by demanding that men prioritize public health over personal comfort and set
examples for others by refraining from spitting. Further, men were encouraged to police one
another by publically rebuking those engaging in the nasty habit.
Despite public health reformers’ claims to authority, however, they struggled to contain
public spitting. The proliferation of anti-spitting ordinances and an apparent shift in public
attitudes against spitting could not alleviate the fact that the old habit continued as if the laws had
never existed: spit still adorned city sidewalks, gathered in women’s dresses, and entered homes
on the soles of men’s shoes. As if in mockery of city ordinances, men spit before posters
ordering them not to. Thus, a little over a decade after inaugurating a regulatory tactic for
combating spitting, public health reformers were forced to revisit their strategy and develop new
methods for mitigating the spitting problem in American cities.
***
In 1895, a Pennsylvania doctor named Elmer B. Borland presented a paper about the
dangers of spitting to the Allegheny County Medical Society. Like many formally trained
physicians, Borland had become convinced that tuberculosis was a contagious disease and that

11

“100 ‘Spitters’ Arrested,” Washington Post, Jun. 27, 1907.
8

“restriction and regulation of the spitting habit” was necessary for the alleviation of
consumption. Writing about the speech several years later in the Journal of the American
Medical Association, Borland recalled that “[n]ine of the ten members who took part in the
discussion agreed that restriction and regulation were needed.” Of that group, however, six
thought any form of regulation impractical. They believed passage of such regulations would be
difficult, if not impossible, and lamented that “[w]omen can, but men can not, change their filthy
spitting habit.” Borland disagreed, arguing that “most men had the natural instinct of cleanliness
and could be educated up to this level with women.” Those who could not – “the ignorant,
unteachable, and vicious” – must be controlled anyway, for the tragedy of tuberculosis
demanded it.12
Borland’s speech came during a watershed moment in the history of American medicine.
For much of the nineteenth century American doctors were relegated to fairly marginal social
positions, their careers not incorporating the prestige, wealth, and influence twentieth century
Americans would ascribe to them. The transition from marginalization to authority came during
the same era as, and in some ways because of, advances in germ theory. Few figures symbolize
the burgeoning authority of turn-of-the-century American medicine as well as Herman Biggs, the
director of New York City’s Department of Health. Biggs argued that germ theory transformed
the duties of health departments and used that rationale to develop a series of initiatives that
cities around the world later adopted. His early accomplishments included mandatory

12

Elmer B. Borland, “JAMA 100 Years Ago: ‘Municipal Regulation of the Spitting Habit,’”
Journal of the American Medical Association, Oct. 11, 2000, 284 (14): 1760.
9

notification of TB cases on the part of public hospitals, the formation of medical inspection
teams for the sanitation of tenements, and the nation’s first anti-spitting ordinance.13
Passed in 1896, New York’s ordinance banned spitting in public conveyances, such as
streetcars and steamboats, and in public buildings. Further, the ordinance called for the posting
of anti-spitting notices in all places were spitting was banned, as well as the installation of
receptacles for the purpose, as the Brooklyn Daily Eagle put it, of leaving “the tobacco eating
public without excuse for miscellaneous deportment.”14 The posting of notices and the provision
of receptacles represented the health department’s effort to regulate spitting even when officers
of the law were not present to enforce the ban. These tactics revealed municipal authorities’
acknowledgment that a spitting ban would be difficult to enforce, and thus demanded persistent
public defense and a constant reminder of the anti-spitting authority. Brooklyn, which passed an
ordinance quickly after New York City, called on local voluntary organizations, such as the
Women’s Health Protective Association (WHPA), to craft slogans for the public notices that
would be as intelligible and persuasive to broad swaths of the city’s population as possible.
The WHPA was a fitting choice for such a task: comprised of some of Brooklyn’s most
prominent women, they dedicated themselves to causes of public health and urban beautification
and prided themselves on their influence within the health department. Their discussion began
with the unanimous decision to include the word “spit,” rather than “expectorate,” on notices, as
“the plainest terms would be understood by all.” Another member opposed the phrase “Do not
spit on the floor of this car” for being too limited and perhaps even promoting spitting on walls

13

Information about Biggs can be found in Starr, The Social Transformation of American
Medicine (New York: 1982); John Duffy, The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health
(Urbana: 1990); and Knopf, A History of the National Tuberculosis Association (Philadelphia,
1922)
14
Brooklyn Daily Eagle, “Expectoration,” Feb. 14, 1896
10

and windows. While some members preferred “Do nnot spit in this car,” it was a broader, and
decidedly more severe phrase,, “Spitting positively forbidden
forbidden,”” that eventually carried the day.
day
The choice signified
ied both the WHPA’s and the Brooklyn Department of Health’s goal of
challenging as many spitters as possible. By choosing plain and straightforward language, they
hoped no person would fail to understand that goal.15

Fig. 1. A placard similar to that designed by the Brooklyn Women’s Health
Protective Association. This sign was used in Chicago street cars in 1910
and designed by a coalition of municipal officials and leaders of local
civic groups, such as the United Charities and the Chicago Tuberculosis
Institute.16

Medical authorities not only recognized the importance of voluntary assistance from
groups like the WHPA in combating spitting, they were also often spurred into action against the
habit by those very groups.17 The Civic Club of Hartford, Connecticut, another assembly of

15

“W.H.P.A. Believes in Baseball,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle,, May 8, 1896.; for more on the
relationship between corporate advertising and antituberculosis reformers, see Tomes, The
Gospel of Germs, 116-123.
16
“Join Anti-Spitting Crusade,” Chicago Tribune
Tribune, Apr. 1, 1910.
17
See Sarah Deutsch, Women and the City, especially 138 - 139. Historians
ians of women’s
organizations have debated whether they accomplished a “domestication of politics” while
11

prominent women, added anti-spitting to an inventory of desired reforms that included the
establishment of waste disposal services, the censorship of billboards and playbills, and the
construction of municipal parks. While spitting rarely dominated their interests, their meeting
minutes reveal that it was nonetheless a constant issue of concern following the passage of New
York’s ordinance in 1896. In December of that year, the Club discussed “whether tobacco
spitting could be controlled by the city.” Just a few weeks later, in January, 1897, their lobbying
led to a ban on spitting in city streetcars; by spring, they added to their long list of tasks the
expansion of the spitting ban to include train stations, as well as the posting of public notices
similar to those created by the WHPA in Brooklyn. Even three years after Hartford’s first
spitting ban passed in 1897, the Civic Club’s “plan of work for the year” included extending “its
efforts toward cleanliness of streets and cleanliness of sidewalks…especially in the matter of
expectorations.” Indeed, the work of the anti-spitting community was never truly done. It
required constant attention from not only boards of health of police organizations, but also from
the voluntary societies that often initiated spitting bans in the first place.18
And yet medical authorities also recognized that the mere presence of an anti-spitting law
on the books or the support of civically minded elites was likely not sufficient to quell a habit so
ingrained in the daily routine of American life. Further, in lieu of cities stationing police officers
on every public conveyance and within every public building, the success of anti-spitting
maintaining a distinctly separate, feminine vision of public space and the public sphere, or if
engaging with urban politics marked a “destruction…of women’s separate vision…as they
slipped into the mire of co-optation.” The spitting issue reveals that while the distinctly male
realm of professional medicine influenced the reforms women’s groups sought, that influence
did not mark a “destruction,” but rather an inspiration. Politically engaged women reacted to
advancements in public health such as anti-spitting by giving them the political support
necessary to flourish in cities throughout the United States. At the same time, women challenged
a distinctly male behavior and shaped notions of public propriety to suit their interests.
18
Hartford Civic Club Records, 1895 – 1920: Volume I, Connecticut Historical Society,
Hartford, CT.
12

ordinances depended merely on coercive notices like those posted in Brooklyn. To mitigate gaps
in enforcement, disgusted or annoyed civilians were encouraged, even expected, to stand up to
spitters. As a 1901 incident in Manhattan revealed, however, the strategy of civilian dependence
was fraught with conflict for the anti-spitting public. During a ride on the Sixth Avenue elevated
train, a passenger identified as “H.A.C.” saw a man in “a new overcoat and patent leather shoes
and a silk hat” enter the car and take a seat near him. Scarcely had the well-dressed man settled
in before “he began to make noisy attempts to remove catarrhal impediments from his throat, and
to ‘expatiate’…almost between [H.A.C.’s] feet, and this despite a legend put up in play view by
the Board of Health forbidding such a thing.” Upon returning home, H.A.C. dashed off a letter to
the editor of the Times, asking, “[w]hat are you going to do about it, Mr. Editor?”19
Yet it was not the editor who responded; instead, in the following days a series of letters
appeared challenging H.A.C.’s courage, manhood, and sense of civic duty. One writer argued
that rather than “weakly calling on others to abate the nuisance for him, ‘H.A.C.’ should take a
hand for himself.” He more broadly challenged all of New York’s men, noting that “[i]f more
men were really men in courage to do their part in abating evils…the beastly nuisance
[spitting]…would show a rapid decline.”20 Another writer argued that every man that “suffers
from the spitting crime” should defend himself by calling attention to public notices and “the fact
that the act is a crime.” While the writer did not believe it was proper for women to so forwardly
address spitters, he did suggest that any woman offended by a spitter should “slowly rise from
her seat and draw her skirts carefully about her feet, meanwhile transfixing the offender with a
hard-boiled eye, and then reseat herself with equal care.” Anything less than these responses was

19
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“The Spitting Nuisance,” The New York Times, Jan. 4, 1901.
“How to Treat Spitters,” The New York Times, Jan. 6, 1901.
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considered an “invertebrate” lapse in the public duty to “make our city clean and keep it so.”21
To his credit, a mortified H.A.C. responded several weeks later. He wrote that following the
public rebukes, he had been “[s]tricken to the lowest button of my conscience” and longed for
the opportunity to reclaim his pride through the public excoriation of a spitter. He soon had his
opportunity, and delighted in the “eloquent silence, uncomfortable wriggles, and temporary selfrestraint” he inspired in the offending man. Bolstered by the experience, H.A.C. proclaimed,
“[w]e are getting on, for we, the anti-spitters, are advancing from mere letter writing to
action….we are gathering courage to take a hand ourselves.”22
The voluntary assistance of the WHPA and H.A.C.’s humiliating experience reveal three
significant consequences that followed the early passage of anti-spitting ordinances. First, boards
of health and their supporters had come to associate all spitting, including the very common
discharge of tobacco juice, with the spread of consumption. Unlike New York’s 1889 leaflet,
which emphasized only the dangers of infected persons’ spit, ordinances and their related notices
made no distinction between tubercular and otherwise healthy spitters. Part of this approach
derived from a recognition that tuberculosis remained dormant in many of its victims, and thus
anyone, whether they manifested symptoms or not, could be a carrier.23 More importantly,
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“The Spitting Habit,” The New York Times, Jan. 6, 1901.
“The Anti-Spitting Campaign,” The New York Times, Jan. 23, 1901. In a move similar to
23
The rate of tuberculosis infection varied from city to city, but was in decline throughout much
of the United States by the end of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, as David Barnes has
noted, “far more people are infected with (that is, exposed to) the bacillus than ever experience
symptoms.” Indeed, Barnes argues that there “is reason to suppose that in many industrial cities a
century ago, nearly the entire population was infected with tuberculosis.” The small fraction of
infected individuals who later developed symptoms, however, was often from the working class,
among whom “the obstacles to maintaining a decent standard of living were formidable.”
Tubercular Americans enjoying higher standards of living, including consistent nutrition, clean
workspaces, and sanitary housing were not as likely to develop symptoms. Thus, despite high
rates of infection, health officials targeted immigrant and working-class Americans because of
22
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however, reformers believed that different socioeconomic groups had unique responsibilities
within the anti-spitting movement. Immigrants and members of the working-class – the groups
most likely to contract tuberculosis – should abstain because their spit was viewed as a distinct
threat to public health. Members of the middle-class had to stop because they served as an
example to their social “inferiors.”24 If they continued the habit, infected working-class
individuals would believe spitting to be socially acceptable. The purpose of anti-spitting notices
and ordinances, therefore, was not only to stop the spread of the disease, but also to promote
middle-class values and cleaner public spaces by restraining a behavior that seemed to permeate
all levels of American society.25
The prevention of spitting, particularly through the proliferation of public notices against
the habit, led to the second consequence of anti-spitting ordinances: the increased prominence of
health departments and their associated reform organizations in the lives of all urban citizens. Of
course, this period saw a flurry of health board activities that brought affected the majority of
citizens, but much of that activity was either intermittent (such as mass vaccinations) or not
clearly visible in daily life (such as food or water regulations).26 When it came to anti-spitting,
however, citizens could not escape the message. Whether they were riding in streetcars, entering
public buildings, or, as the scope of ordinances expanded, walking on sidewalks, the public was
constantly reminded of anti-spitting notices and the bureaucratic coalitions that promulgated
their more consistently visible symptoms. See David Barnes, The Making of a Social Disease:
Tuberculosis in Nineteenth Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 4-5.
24
Similarly to Barnes, Nancy Tomes notes that at the turn-of-the-century, “poor, immigrant, and
nonwhite Americans were increasingly more likely to contract the disease than were their
affluent, native-born, white peers.” See Tomes, The Gospel of Germs, 128.
25
See Georgina D. Feldberg, Disease and Class: Tuberculosis and the Shaping of Modern North
American Society (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995).
26
For more on vaccination, see Michael Willrich, Pox: An American History (New York:
Penguin, 2011); for more on food and water regulation, see John Duffy, The Sanitarians, 175 –
190.
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them. A Sterling, Kansas woman’s 1904 poem illustrates the ubiquity of notices and their effect
on a young spitter in her town, which had recently passed an ordinance of its own:
The shades of night were falling fast
As through a Kansas city passed
A youth who saw, all fresh and nice,
A poster with this strange device –
Please do not spit on the sidewalks.
His brow was sad; and in his cheek
A quid so big he scarce could speak;
It seemed to be on ev’ry tongue, -On ev’ry passing breeze ‘twas flung,
Please do not spit on the sidewalks.27
The poet went on to describe the local women, members of the city’s Sorosis Society, as a
“tempest overhead/Of wrathful, suffering Sterling dames/As they beheld what stuck to their
trains.” Furious with the spit collecting on their dresses, the “Sterling dames” haunt the young
man, who then throws away his tobacco, presumably never to chew the “vile Indian weed” again.
The poet punctuated her work with the authoritative, yet graceful, figure of the anti-spitter:
And from a maid serene and far,
A voice fell like a falling star –
Please do not spit on the sidewalks.
Of course the poem represents an imagined, even fantastical, result of anti-spitting notices and
public sympathy for the ordinances. However, it also dramatically illustrates the ubiquity of antispitting notices throughout communities with ordinances and the dream of anti-spitters that
violators would change their ways when faced with immense public pressure.
While the health bureaucracy restricted spitters, it created opportunities for political
influence to other citizens, such the women of the WHPA, the Hartford Civic Club, and the
Sterling Sorosis Society. Although they could not vote, organized women’s groups aligned their

27

“Difficulties in Village Improvement and How to Meet Them,” The Chautauquan, Apr. 1904,
39 (2): 180.
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efforts with causes of municipal health and thus shaped their cities through the authority of an
expanding bureaucracy. That relationship also signified the third significant consequence of early
anti-spitting ordinances: they altered the expectations and limitations of citizenship and gender
roles. For example, H.A.C. and the male readers of his public rebukes were forced to see public
spitting as a challenge to their identities as male citizens. Where several years before spitting in
public was considered an innocuous, albeit annoying act, it had become instead a test of the antispitting man’s courage. For failing to stop an offender, H.A.C.’s character was publically sullied.
Further, the men who actually did the spitting found their social standing degraded by witnesses;
the “expectorating dude” whom H.A.C. failed to stop was no longer a typical man passing his
commute by absentmindedly spitting. Instead, he was “obnoxious,” an “offensive animal” of a
lower order than New York’s stray dogs.28
By the turn-of-the-century, the boards of health in a number of major American cities,
including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and Boston, passed anti-spitting ordinances
similar to New York’s.29 Though spitting bans varied, they all targeted public conveyances,
particularly streetcars. Enclosed conveyances were among the most intimate of public spaces
during the period, and thus spitting within them seemed more offensive, and more deleterious,
than spitting on sidewalks or streets. Whereas the spit of a pedestrian dotted a path, the spit of a
rail passenger gathered in pools of amber juice or phlegm at the floor of the car. Confined in
crowded streetcars, passengers were forced to endure the pooling of dozens, or hundreds, of
passengers’ spit as it accumulated throughout the day. One can only imagine the panic of
passengers who, like H.A.C., were aware of germ theory as pools of spit streamed toward their
feet. During the warmer months, rail companies often “opened” streetcars by removing their
28
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windows, which theoretically relieved passengers from the cramped quarters; yet as ordinances
succeeded in restricting spitting in streetcars, passengers took advantage of the open windows to
“sit inside and spit out, secure in the fact that the conductor [would] not interfere” unless he saw
spit on the floor. This out-of-windows spitting may have alleviated the problem of spit pooling
on car floors, but the summer spitter was nonetheless menacing as he sent “a fountain of fine
spray which the wind distribute[d] over his fellow-passengers.”30 Of course, those fellow
passengers, left “to wipe the slimy salivary spray from their faces,” were not the only victims of
out-of-windows spitting: the spit that successfully left the streetcars’ windows was bound for the
street, the sidewalk, and the people outside of the car.31
Problems such as spitting out of open cars, as well as the persistence of spitting in
previously unregulated places, such as sidewalks, encouraged cities and states to expand the
reach of anti-spitting ordinances. The evolution of Virginia’s legislation provides an illustrative
example: initially passed in 1901, the Virginia statute banned spitting on church floors and aisles.
The following year, lawmakers amended the statute to include a fine of between $1.00 and
$10.00 “for expectorating in electric cars.” In 1903, they added a prohibition against spitting “in
public places, buildings, theaters, steamboats, railways, and street cars, and other public
conveyances.”32 In Virginia and elsewhere, lawmakers, boards of health, and public health
reformers were coming to understand that anti-spitting ordinances could regulate the habit in
distinct spaces, such as streetcars, but they were failing to discourage the practice more broadly.
If they banned spitting in streetcars, men spat out of them; if they banned spitting on ferryboats,
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men simply spit in ferry houses instead.33 In response to their wily opponents, anti-spitters
refined their goals: they would regulate spitting everywhere and seek to eliminate the “filthy and
useless habit” from public life.34
Although ordinances themselves did not extend to private homes or work places, boards
of health nonetheless recognized the importance of regulating such spaces if they were to
effectively control spitting. To illustrate this point, health officials often challenged both
employers and employees to take responsibility for clean work spaces. In a presentation at the
1906 Philadelphia Tuberculosis Exhibition, a doctor named H.R.M. Landis connected workplace
spitting to tuberculosis through the stories of his patients. He told of a baker recently admitted to
the Pennsylvania’s White Haven Sanatorium who had shared a shop with tubercular co-workers
for years. As the men went through their daily routines, they spit into wooden boxes filled with
sawdust, rather than disinfectant cuspidors. While poor lighting and ventilation played a role in
the bakery’s tuberculosis problem, Landis argued that the boxes of dried spit and dust caused
four employees to fall ill. Another of his patients, a young woman “in whose family there had
never been a case of consumption,” had contracted the disease after taking work in a
Philadelphia garment factory. Conditions throughout the shop were “vile” and included poor
lighting, dampness, and roach infestation. Nonetheless, Landis argued that the shop’s primary
health threat was its spitting problem. Next to the young woman “worked a man who coughed
and expectorated freely.” Lacking even a box, he spit onto the dusty floor “under her machine, so
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that, in adjusting the machinery, she often knelt in some of this sputum, containing countless
tubercle bacilli.”35
In response to such conditions, Landis promoted a series of regulations that extended
anti-spitting authority into places of work. Seeking to eliminate “ignorance of the dangers on the
part of both the employer and the employed,” he advocated the posting of placards throughout
shops prohibiting spitting on the floor. Further, he encouraged employers to provide cuspidors
containing lye, which disinfected spit, and to thoroughly clean the cuspidors each day. He also
expected employers to track the health of employees and demand that tubercular individuals use
pocket cuspidors and paper napkins and immediately dispose of their sputum. Recognizing the
difficulty of extending fines or arresting employees within their shops, Landis nonetheless
advocated for the swift punishment of workplace spitters. The employee who continued to spit
after fair warning deserved no consideration, and “measures should be taken to make him leave
the place.”36 By the end of the decade, health boards throughout the United States took up
Landis’s charge and officially banned spitting in eating establishments, bakeries,
slaughterhouses, hotels, and schools. As they expanded the reach of spitting bans, states further
sought to define the behavior as universally pernicious and threatening, and thus inappropriate
for both the public and private spheres.37
In an effort to emphasize the threat of spitting and the extent of their authority, states and
municipalities tinkered with punishments ranging from small fines to imprisonment. They sought
a balance between severe punishments that would frighten spitters out of their habit and
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reasonable ones that would encourage police officers and magistrates to actually enforce the
legislation. The ordinance of Brookline, Massachusetts was unique in that unlike most others,
which were extended over time, upon its initial passage in 1898 it banned spitting in public
conveyances, shops, stores, schoolhouses, and all public steps and sidewalks. Yet in seeking a
balance to the rather extensive law, Brookline’s board of health officially noted that “spitting
into the gutter or street is not forbidden.” Further, police officers enforcing the ordinance were
encouraged to exercise “both vigilance and tact.” Officers witnessing spitting were to issue
warnings by informing offenders of the city ordinance. Only upon witnessing a repeat offense
were officers they to arrest offending spitters. Tactics such as Brookline’s represented
municipalities’ recognition that anti-spitting ordinances were a significant challenge to the status
quo. By balancing the leniency of the warning policy with the severity of arrest, they hoped to
bolster the law’s effectiveness without generating challenges to their authority.38
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Figure 2. Patrolmen in Brookline, Massachusetts carried copies
of the city’s anti-spitting ordinance and were expected to “exercise
both vigilance and tact” when enforcing it. Image courtesy of the
College of Physicians of Philadelphia.

Brookline’s strategy was fairly typical, however some early laws tended away from
balance and towards more severity. For example, in 1901 New York withheld the authority to
impose a $500.00 fine against spitters.39 Cincinnati fined first-time offenders $100.00 while
charging repeat spitters the same amount and jailing them for ninety days.40 Such draconian
punishments attempted to intimidate spitters out of their habit and to express medical authorities’
insistence that spitting was a potentially lethal habit and merited grave consequences. Yet as one
commentator argued, draconian punishments just as easily subverted the ordinances, as few
“would expect the actual enforcement of a fine anywhere near [such limits], and the implied
threat of such a disproportionate punishment tends to defeat the whole thing.”41
Whether or not health authorities accepted that conclusion, they generally did agree that
arrests and convictions defined the success of anti-spitting campaigns. Reporting on that success
before the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis (NASPT) in 1910,
St. Louis physician Robert Newton argued that since 1896, a total of 2,513 spitters had been
arrested in New York, but only 908 spitters faced similar consequences throughout the rest of the
country. Considering that approximately 25 million Americans lived in anti-spitting
communities, Newton believed the total of 3,421 arrests (“undoubtedly all males,” he noted)
represented “a failure to enforce the laws.”42 Further, of those 3,421, only 2,912 were convicted,
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with fine averaging only about $1.40. Of course, in compiling and presenting these statistics
Newton neglected the thousands of state interventions that did not result in conviction. His data
does not account for the man who checked his habit upon seeing a public notice; it does not
include the men who received official warnings from police officers and curtailed spitting
thereafter (as in Brookline); it ignores the role of public shaming, such as H.A.C. attempted on
the Sixth Avenue elevated car; and it disregards the significance of arrests that did not lead to
conviction. In other words, by defining success as consistent punishment through arrests and
fines, anti-spitters like Newton ignored the effectiveness of their campaign’s diverse strategies.
The paucity of spitting arrests and relative leniency of fines also revealed several key
points about anti-spitting ordinances and medical authority more broadly. First, while boards of
health effectively lobbied mayors and city councils to pass ordinances, their influence over
police officers and magistrates to enforce them was inconsistent at best. Following the passage of
its first anti-spitting ordinance, the rate of arrests for spitting in Buffalo, New York was about
one per day. As supporters of the law believed each streetcar to contain at least two or three
spitters, those results were disappointing. Yet when asked about the apparent lack of
enforcement, one Buffalo police officer argued that “[i]t’s a pretty hard thing to arrest a man
merely for spitting on the floor…I don’t see any harm about it, unless a feller does it on a man’s
shoes.” During the same week, a reporter witnessed another officer spitting on a streetcar while
he was supposed to be patrolling for spitters.43 Police officers therefore hesitated to enforce the
law because many were themselves spitters, or at least sympathized with the tobacco-chewing
and phlegm-congested public. Further, accused spitters seemed genuinely shocked by
reprimands. Although it was an extreme example, one St. Paul, Minnesota arresting officer so
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angered a group of spitters that they turned on him, beating him until his “head [was] broken,
two of his ribs [were] fractured, and his body [was] seriously bruised.”44 While the details of the
altercation do not survive, and the incident nonetheless illustrates the indignation and rage
incited by anti-spitting enforcement. Perhaps reasonably, many officers concluded that antispitting was simply not worth the trouble. In other cities, not only police officers but also
magistrates resisted enforcing anti-spitting ordinances. Judges regularly released spitters without
punishment for a number of reasons, including ignorance of the law, claims of unintentional
spitting, or even admitting to their offense without making excuses.45 Following scores of
spitting arrests in New York, one magistrate released prisoners because they had only spit once.
“A man has a right to spit once,” he reasoned, “especially before he was warned.”46 Anti-spitting
advocates rationalized such inconsistent enforcement as evidence of “indifference…a lack of
civic pride, and a failure to appreciate the danger from the unrestrained practice of this vile
habit.”47 Whether they blamed a lack of pride or appreciation, however, they had to face the
reality that the entire machinery of law did not support the cause. Legislators and executives
might pass an ordinance, but it was to no avail if police officers and magistrates did not enforce
it.
Yet inconsistent arrests and convictions also suggested an inability on the part of
authorities to convince the public that spitting truly represented a threat to public health. Even
those who accepted germ theory sometimes regarded anti-spitting as a “trifle” or “legislative
joke” that interfered with more important efforts such as the regulation of tenements or the
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establishment of sanitariums.48 Following the 1901 meeting of the American Congress of
Tuberculosis, one Los Angeles writer complained that the Congress’s support of anti-spitting
ordinances was “worn out” and that too many health reformers ignored the “impracticability of
such methods.”49 While there were many reasons why individuals opposed anti-spitting,
reformers’ support of the laws for reasons besides public health was likely a chief cause of the
levity with which some viewed them. Indeed, as anti-spitting ordinances grew in popularity, they
came to act a sort of municipal status symbol. Residents of cities with legislation proudly
promoted it as a sign of their order, cleanliness, and modernization. Following the 1899 passage
of a comprehensive ordinance in Hoboken, New Jersey, the journal Medical News held up the
city as “a good example” of what was possible if boards of health, lawmakers, and police officers
could do if they worked together.50 One writer noted that if Chicago hoped to challenge Boston
as “the hub of culture, par excellence,” it had to enforce anti-spitting as well as Boston had.51
The example extended beyond metropolises, as small town boards of health and myriad local
organizations promoted anti-spitting as a necessary component of modernization. Alton,
Missouri, with an approximate population of 470, received national approbation after passing its
anti-spitting ordinance, an achievement The New York Times argued had made Alton a “modern
spotless town.”52 Getrude Bosler Biddle, a member of the Civic Club of Carlisle, Pennsylvania,
noted that despite the hesitance of rural communities like Carlisle to “see the needs to the
present,” groups of citizens dedicated to improvement could usher the “modern progress” of
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cities to small towns. Biddle argued that the first step in any such project should be to
“attack…the dirty streets,” a mission that eventually led to the passage of Carlisle’s anti-spitting
ordinance in 1903.53
As proud as cities that successfully passed and enforced anti-spitting ordinances were, the
frustrations of reformers in communities that struggled to pass ordinances revealed the
significance of anti-spitting status among “progressive” cities. They generally accepted the logic
of communities like Hoboken and Carlisle and expressed annoyed disappointment when local
police could not punish spitters. One Washington, D.C. writer complained that because of the
ubiquity of public spitting in his city, “[o]nly a robust person, with a stomach warranted to bear
any test, can walk a mile…along our sidewalks…and not be made distressfully sick.” Yet he
became truly frustrated when comparing his sidewalks with those of Helena, Montana, a city
“popularly supposed to be controlled by mining, ranchman, and cowboy influences” and yet
maintaining a well-enforced anti-spitting ordinance. How was it, he wondered, that such a
provincial locale could proudly promote its spitting regulation while Washington, “the most
beautiful city on the globe, the headquarters of the most progressive and powerful nation on
earth,” could allow the pernicious habit to flourish?54 The writer had reason to be concerned, as
commentators in other cities took notice of D.C.’s weak spitting regulations: as one journalist put
it, St. Louis’ well enforced anti-spitting ordinance “put the city far in advance of Washington,
which though it lead in beauty of city plan, is noted for the expectoration filth to be seen upon its
sidewalks.”55 Similarly perplexed was Dr. A.S. Warthin, the secretary, and later president, of
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Michigan’s Association for the Prevention and Relief of Tuberculosis, who fumed about his
state’s inability to pass and enforce anti-spitting ordinances: “If Louisville, Kentucky,” he
wondered, “with its negro population, can prevent spitting, why can’t we?”56 In Warthin’s
calculus, anti-spitting theoretically represented cleanliness as well as racial and intellectual
superiority. Yet Louisville’s successful ordinance – and Michigan’s inability to pass
comprehensive legislation – challenged his assumptions. A New Orleans doctor named W.
Scheppegrell worried that the failure of a proposed anti-spitting ordinance “would make us the
subject of ridicule.”57 During a furious campaign of letter writing to the city’s major newspapers,
Scheppegrell emphasized that of New Orleans’ thousands of TB deaths, it was “fair to infer that
a considerable number…are due to the neglect of…sanitary precautions” such as anti-spitting.58
The medical community’s perspective was simple: to heed their knowledge could save thousands
of lives; to allow spitting to continue unrestricted would almost certainly allow TB to continue
its deadly rampage and signal a triumph of ignorance. And yet the concern for social status
evident in both Warthin’s and Scheppegrell’s laments proved to be equally significant, as broad
swaths of the public continued to challenge the meaning of anti-spitting.59
Perhaps the most illustrative public debate about the meaning of anti-spitting legislation
occurred in Washington in 1903. Spurred by the support of frustrated District residents, City
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Commissioner Henry Macfarland called for the expansion of anti-spitting ordinances to include
sidewalks, public buildings, theaters, and parks. Macfarland had supported similar expansions a
year earlier, but his proposal failed because the other two commissioners believed anti-spitting
was unenforceable outside of confined spaces. Yet Macfarland succeeded in bringing his
proposal to the table again in March, 1903 and called for a public meeting on the issue. In
advance of the meeting, the District Commission solicited citizens’ opinions regarding the
proposed ordinance. A series of “letters, notes, and postal cards” quickly flooded the
commissioners’ offices.60 While many letter writers could not attend the public meeting because
it was held on a weekday morning, 37 district residents did come with prepared comments.
Among them were some of the city’s most influential residents, representing churches, the
business community, women’s organizations, and even the federal government.
As the meeting opened to public comment, it seemed that the room was universally
supportive of expanding anti-spitting. Gerhart A. Wilson, a Presbyterian minister, noted that
“[s]ome of the walks are positively nauseating to members of my family.” W.P. Van Wickle, the
owner of a local “piano agency,” argued that banning the “evil” of spitting was the only
reasonable course of action and had the full support of the business community. United States
Surgeon General Walter Wyman sent a representative to read a message in which he cited the
1901 British Congress of Tuberculosis, which concluded that “tuberculosis sputum is the main
agent for the conveyance of the virus from man to man.” Numerous representatives of local
reform societies spoke as well, including Ellen Spencer Mussey of the District’s Legion of Loyal
Women. She claimed to speak for “7,000 of her sex” who were “unanimously in favor of
restrictions in the habit of spitting upon the public streets of the city.” The preponderance of spit,
60

“Join In The Crusade: Scores of Letters Approving an Anti-Spitting Law,” Washington Post,
Mar. 24, 1903.
28

she argued, had “rendered the thoroughfares of the National Capital unfit for people of
refinement.” She also reminded the commissioners of children’s welfare, as “those playing on
the sidewalks in front of their homes” were often “exposed to the disease germs from sputum.”
Indeed, as the meeting grew long and morning turned to afternoon, it seemed anti-spitting
supporters represented every District demographic, from business owners to children.61
Yet before the meeting finished, three men rose in opposition to the proposal. The first,
named Minton P. Key, delivered a brief and fairly incoherent harangue of “the present agitation,”
which he argued was impossible to enforce and did nothing to support “helpless womanhood.”
More effectively, Dr. Charles Allen argued that anti-spitting was both dangerous and ineffective.
Noting that he spoke “for the common people,” Allen charged that “[w]e’ve had too many laws
in this country, and it is not good to make so many more in addition.” He challenged medical
authority as limited and incompetent, personified by men who could not cure consumption and
thus sought instead to limit the rights of individuals through their “ridiculous…crusade.” He also
pointed to behaviors and trends that posed a greater threat than spitting. “Kissing,” he argued,
“causes more disease than anything else, yet it is done all over the city and all over the world.” In
an accusation directly targeting the 7,000 women supporting Ellen Munsey earlier in the
meeting, he argued that it was not spit that posed a public threat, but “the long skirts that the
women wear nowadays.” Such fashions, and the women who wore them, acted as “breeders of
disease,” and rather than regulating men’s behaviors for the convenience of fashion, Allen
argued women should curtail their dresses to accommodate spitters. The final voice of
opposition, a man named R.C. Glascock, worried that the proposed law facilitated a tyrannical
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municipal government, under which “if you should happen to spit on the sidewalks, you are to be
dragged off to a dungeon.”62
Opponents of anti-spitting thus focused on four central points. First, as Allen argued at
the D.C. hearing, anti-spitting was one of many laws that constricted liberty within an everexpanding public sphere. As D.C. resident R.W. Scheckells complained in the Washington Post,
the prohibition of spitting on sidewalks threatened individual rights by circumscribing acceptable
behaviors on “public thoroughfares, to which strangers, as well as local residents, have a legal
and inalienable right.”63 While spitting was unquestionably unpleasant, it was perhaps
unavoidable. By supporting its prohibition, citizens not only surrendered their right to public
space but handed potentially authoritarian powers to the state. One New Orleans writer warned
of the potentially drastic consequences: “Persons suffering from a cold, persons who are
thoughtless, will be hauled off to jail; and even if they are subsequently bailed out or released…it
will not cure the indignity of being publically bustled to jail as lawbreakers, marched through the
streets for the amusement of a gaping crowd or hauled off to prison in a patrol wagon.” Implicit
in the prediction are concerns over the appropriate use of force in law enforcement and the extent
to which the state can reasonably regulate the public sphere. Certainly the state should punish
“highwaymen, burglars, and pickpockets,” but spitters? For anti-spitting opponents, punishing
spitters uncomfortably blurred lines between law breaking and law abiding, between criminals

62

Ibid.; Antituberculosis reformers also called attention to the dangers of kissing. According to
Nancy Tomes, prescriptive literature urged mothers “not only to prevent strangers from kissing
their children, but even to give up the practice themselves.” For more, see The Gospel of Germs,
126, 127.
63
“Penalty for Spitting,” Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1903.
30

and innocent civilians. Crime was intolerable, of course, but was not petty offensiveness an
unavoidable condition of society?64
The second point of opposition challenged medical authority and competence. Like
Allen’s condemnation of anti-spitting as an excuse for doctors who failed to cure tuberculosis,
Scheckells targeted “would-be-sanitary experts” and scientists, “to whom big salaries are paid by
an indulgent generous government.” While the war against microbes relied on forceful and
persuasive sentiments, he argued, the actual containment of germs found “so little support in
practical life that their suggestions are better in theory than in practice.”65 Scheckells, voicing an
opinion similar to that of the burgeoning anti-vaccination movement, disputed the relevance of
laboratory research in everyday life. And yet it was not only the irrelevance of medical research
that he found problematic. He, like many other opponents of anti-spitting, also feared the
potentially dangerous relationship between formal medicine and governments. If police could
arrest spitters, the logic went, how else might the state circumscribe public norms and erode
liberties?
The third point of opposition generally called attention to other factors contributing to the
spread of tuberculosis, especially women’s dresses. Like Allen’s challenge to women at the D.C.
hearing, Scheckells noted that “ladies skirts often do the work of the broom brigade” by
sweeping up sidewalk spit. Several years earlier, a writer identifying himself as “Libertas” wrote
to the Brooklyn Daily Eagle (choosing to write to the Eagle, he said, because it was named for
“the bird which symbolized freedom and the rights of man”) and accused anti-spitters of sending
men to jail because “the dress of the wife of [a member] of the Department of Health…was
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soiled by contact with the street.”66 In Columbus, Ohio, a city councilor proposed a companion
ordinance to anti-spitting that would require women to wear dresses “at least 3 inches from the
ground.”67 Obviously some men took this position seriously enough to propose legislation
enforcing it, but most likely meant to illustrate what they saw as the arbitrary nature of
government regulation of personal behavior. If the state bases its case against spitting on the fact
that it soils women’s dresses, they argued, why stop at spitting? Why not also ban the dresses?
Yet this argument also had the dual effect of turning blame for tuberculosis away from mostly
male spitters and onto women. Further, the argument against dresses (as well as kissing)
suggested that individuals should police their personal behavior to protect themselves, rather
than the state policing behaviors to protect others. If women wore shorter skirts and couples
stopped kissing, the thinking went, the spread of tuberculosis would slow and men could
continue spitting as they always had.68 Yet this argument simultaneously conflicted with the
fourth point of opposition, namely the right of citizens to be comfortable. While Allen and the
other opponents at the D.C. meeting did not focus on this point, Scheckells and numerous others
did, arguing that “the natural inclination to expectorate, whether using tobacco or not, is so
strong in our habits that it is almost a necessity and frequently beyond our control.” Echoing the
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concern of doctors hearing Elmer Borland’s speech eight years earlier, Scheckells grounded his
point in the seemingly unconscious nature of spitting.69 Indeed, a number of spitters were so
accustomed to the habit that when informed of their violation, they often argued that they had not
spit at all. For example, during his arrest for spitting on Brooklyn’s Fifth Avenue elevated car in
1901, William McDonald told the arresting officer “that he really had no idea that he had been
spitting in the car.”70 To make men such as McDonald entirely conscious of their public
behavior, and worse, to make them hold their spit until they could appropriately discharge it,
seemed to opponents of anti-spitting an excessive burden.
The summation of these four points, whether those of the incoherent and rambling
Minton P. Key or the more poignant challenges of Charles Allen and R.W. Scheckells, was that
anti-spitting ordinances represented a tyrannical overreach on the part of state authorities into the
public deportment of men. They claimed that “irrespective of the clamoring of a few
‘progressionists,’” the majority of citizens opposed anti-spitting as “repugnant to the rights,
privileges, and advantages” of citizenship.71 Whether or not the majority of citizens felt that way,
however, anti-spitting remained popular with the governments and organizations that had the
power to institute ordinances. Despite the outcry of men like Allen and Scheckells, the D.C.
ordinance easily passed and extended the city’s spitting ban to include nearly all public space.
Nonetheless, as city after city passed or expanded anti-spitting ordinances, medical authorities
and reformers could hardly celebrate their legislative victories before growing dissatisfied with
limited results. Indeed, as vocal anti-spitting opponents articulated their positions, many more
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effectively challenged the laws by simply spitting as they always had. Whether the average
spitter understood it or not, his habit had become a political act.

During December 1903 and January 1904, the residents of Baltimore noticed a peculiar
sight on the sidewalks and steps surrounding the city hall and courthouse. For eight days,
between 10:00 AM and 2:00 PM, officials of the health department could be observed slowly
walking with their heads down, scribbling notes as they went. As odd as this behavior was, it was
made more unusual by the fact that these were among the coldest days of the year, and few other
city residents could stand to be out-of-doors with the health officials. And yet the sidewalks bore
evidence that health officials were not the only ones out on those frigid days: as a presentation at
Baltimore’s 1904 tuberculosis exposition would reveal, the health department had counted
thousands of “deposits of sputum,” evidence of continually ubiquitous spitting in blatant
disregard of Baltimore’s anti-spitting ordinance.72
Baltimore’s public health officials compiled these so-called “sputistics” in hopes of
shocking the public: surrounding the city hall was a total of 2,013 spit deposits; one day, January
16, yielded 390 deposits alone. Even December 26, a “bitter cold” day, yielded 144. In total, the
average number of spit deposits surrounding the city hall was 251.6 per day, hardly a positive
result for anti-spitters. The situation at the courthouse was even more severe: in the nine days it
was examined, health officials discovered a total of 3,793 deposits of spit with a daily average of
421.5. Another presentation at the exposition presented the grim results of the health
department’s examination of streetcars: after taking 248 car rides, officials counted 944 “deposits
of sputa,” or approximately four per car. More alarmingly, they noted that they had witnessed

72

Anon., “The Maryland Tuberculosis Congress,” Medical News, Feb. 6, 1904, 86 (6).
34

two conductors and five “motormen” spitting on cars; as if to compound the weight of their
evidence against streetcar employees, they pointed out that “pools [of spit] are counted as one
deposit; motormen are depositors of pools.”73
Aside from revealing the obsessive devotion of strident anti-spitters, Baltimore’s
“sputistics” project illustrated one of the central problems of early anti-spitting efforts: despite
their legislative victories and seemingly broad public support, anti-spitters were consistently
frustrated by the tenacious prevalence of spit in their communities. Often that frustration
manifested itself through harsh condemnations of spitters, such as that levied by the St.
Augustine, Florida Board of Health against the city’s residents. Responding to a national antispitting survey in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), board members
complained that “[o]ur native people would consider such an order an insult to their dignity. Can
not stop a Florida cracker from spitting.” In the same article, the author complained that antispitting suffered because “[t]here are…a few persons who consider it their sacred duty to clog
the wheels of preventive medicine,” who would rather “wallow in public expectoration” than
promote public health.74 One Colorado anti-spitter suggested that any “lobster that is too lazy to
step to the edge of the sidewalk to expectorate ought to have his nose rubbed in it.”75 Antispitters described spitting men as ignorant, stubborn, corrupt, and careless, qualities the
Indianapolis physician and poet W.B. Ryan included in a 1908 poem called “The Spitter.”
Written during a period of intensified enforcement of Indianapolis’ anti-spitting ordinance, Ryan
found inspiration in a rural “druggist” who came to the city to take the Indiana medical board
examination and found himself under arrest for spitting. Ryan wrote:
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Went outside ’nd spit terbacker
Right ’nd left, Sir – I have shot,
In a contest, a big mouthful
Full twelve foot. ’nd hit the spot –
Then a feller stepped up to me
’Nd arrested me, fer that!
When I said “I hain’t done nuthin,”
He said, “We saw when you spat.”
The poem goes on to describe the man’s surprise at finding himself in jail and receiving a fine of
eleven dollars for his crime. The use of dialect and Ryan’s focus on the man’s ignorance
represented anti-spitters’ perceptions of those who continued to soil their cities as boorish,
uncouth, and offensive, while Ryan’s subject – a “druggist” – emphasized the corruption and
danger of improperly educated medical professionals. Thus, Ryan’s poem and countless other
examples of derision served not only to condemn spitters but also to reinforce the authority of
medical professionals as refined, educated, and concerned with the public’s health.76
Yet medical professionals and the various reformers that supported them recognized that
not even their harshest derision could improve anti-spitting results. In response, medical and
municipal authorities devised a handful of strategies that they hoped would end spitting once and
for all. The first, most aggressive strategy was police raids, or “dragnets,” that arrested masses of
spitters in a single day and then publicized the arrests. Spitting raids call to mind earlier
questions over the severity of penalties, although they were less concerned with punishing
individual spitters than educating, or perhaps threatening, thousands of others. While their longterm effects are impossible to trace, they generally did succeed in the immediate goal of arresting
and fining hundreds of spitters at a time. A 1909 New York raid provides an example of the
strategy: beginning in the morning, more than forty officers were deployed into public areas,
such as subways, streetcars, or along sidewalks known to invite promiscuous spitting. They were
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ordered to arrest each spitter and immediately bring him to the city’s police court, where he was
quickly tried, fined, and released. By the end of the day, the raid caught 200 spitters, fining
nearly all of them between $0.50 and $2.00. In this case, magistrates based the severity of fines
on the time of day in which the offense occurred, with earlier spitters being let off with the
smaller fine. Further, authorities considered the reasons for spitting in doling out punishment.
Oddly, it was “smokers and tobacco chewers” who were forced to pay the $2.00, while those
who complained of “severe colds” were let off with smaller fines. This decision, of course,
proves what anti-spitting proponents and opponents knew all along: the laws were about much
more than public health. By punishing smokers and chewers, police targeted those who seemed
most careless, but not necessarily those who seemed most threatening. Their decision to treat the
sick leniently also reinforced the notion that spitting was if not completely forgivable, at least
understandably necessary.77
While a number of cities tried spitting raids with varying levels of success, the second
strategy of anti-spitting enforcement sought not to punish, but accommodate, spitters. One
example came from the Cook County, Illinois League of Women’s Clubs, who recommended
providing sand to street car conductors with which they could “cover the objectionable spots on
street car floors.”78 The sand might not prevent future spitting, but at least it would mitigate
whatever threat a day’s collection of spit might pose. A more common proposal was that issued
by Alfred Knopf in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), which called for
widespread marketing of personal cuspidors, or pocket flasks. Knopf promoted a line of such
items produced by the Kny-Scheerer Company, a New York-based manufacture of medical
instruments, arguing that they would allow spitters to continue their habit without soiling public
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space or spreading disease. Ranging in price from about $0.35 to $1.25, the flasks were designed
to appeal to spitters of all income levels. For more discerning tastes, there was a small brass
cylinder with a spring-loaded lid and “an elastic rubber ring for the purpose of preventing
leakage.” Other models were made from “cheap metal” or glass and came with cases resembling
cigar boxes. Knopf also displayed a number of “elevated spittoons” for use in public settings,
which promoted careful and accurate spitting.79 Although Knopf did not mention them in his
JAMA promotion, Kny-Scheerer also produced a line of “self-flushing spittoons” and disposable
paper pocket flasks. In the years following Knopf’s public promotion of pocket flasks, KnyScheerer advertised the models in journals like JAMA and the anti-tuberculosis Journal of the
Outdoor Life (see figure 3). Other doctors, including U.S. Marine-Hospital Service surgeon J.O.
Cobb, designed and marketed their own pocket flasks as well.80 While conducive to all spitting,
the flasks were marketed specifically to tuberculosis patients, with Kny-Scheerer offering
discounts to dealers for “quantity orders” from sanitariums and hospitals.81 In the end,
widespread use of pocket flasks never materialized because of Kny-Scheerer’s narrow marketing
strategy, which advertised the flasks almost exclusively in medical journals. Thus, not only did
their ads reach a small, professional audience that was already convinced of the need to regulate
spitting, they also associated their product with tuberculosis. In an age when public knowledge of
one’s consumption could lead to termination of employment or the voiding of a life insurance
policy, the popular association of the dreaded disease with any consumer product significantly
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impeded sales.82 Of course, even if Knopf’s flasks flourished on the market, they could never
entirely control the spread of tuberculosis. Those groups most affected by consumption –
immigrants and the working-class – were both unlikely to invest in such an item and likely to be
unaware of their infection, thereby not even recognizing the need for a pocket flask.

Figure 3. New York’s Kny-Scheerer Co. worked with Dr. Adolphus
Knopf to design and market “sputum flasks” like these and marketed
them in the Journal of the Outdoor Life, the official journal of the
National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis.

Although widespread adoption of personal spitting receptacles never materialized, the
intent behind them – to manage spitting in a way that would more slowly, but no less completely,
eradicate its ubiquity – suggested the third and most significant response to insufficient antispitting results. Rather than focusing on legal punishment, anti-spitters turned their attention to
programs of education about the dangers of spitting. Realizing that spitters who continued the
habit despite ordinances, public postings, and public reprimand were probably unreachable,
medical authorities and reformers turned to instead to children. As early as 1903, anti-spitters
had realized that the proliferation of the habit was due in large part to “beardless boys” who,
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seeking to emulate older men, spit in defiance city ordinances. Hoping to target just such boys, a
Kalamazoo, Michigan doctor named Charles E. Boys spoke for many of his fellow members of
the state’s Association for the Prevention and Relief of Tuberculosis when, in 1910, he argued
that “you can educate better than to legislate enforcement of ideas into people.” He proposed a
vigorous and visible anti-spitting campaign that no member of the public could escape. Because
a single message was not enough, he contended that “[t]here must be many repetitions and the
information should come from different sources.” Further, Boys and others believed that all
teachers should be trained in germ theory so they “might be better equipped to teach their
pupils.”83
Proposals such as Boys’s represent a turn in American anti-spitting campaigns away from
force and towards more passive, and perhaps more effective, means of coercion. Though public
health officials assured themselves their information was strong and that spitting indeed posed a
threat, they began to realize by 1910 that many Americans were not willing to blindly accept
their authority. And although they continued to advocate anti-spitting ordinances, boards of
health and private municipal, state, and national organizations began to transition anti-spitting
campaigns into their educational phase. It was a decision that had lasting consequences for
American public health.
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